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An International Perspective on 
Oil Price Shocks and U.S. Economic Activity 
 
Abstract: The effect of oil price shocks on U.S. economic activity seems to have changed since 
the mid-1990s.  A variety of explanations have been offered for the seeming change—including 
better luck, the reduced energy intensity of the U.S. economy, a more flexible economy, more 
experience with oil price shocks and better monetary policy.  These explanations point to a 
weakening of the relationship between oil prices shocks and economic activity rather than the 
fundamentally different response that may be evident since the mid-1990s.  Using a dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium model of world economic activity, we employ Bayesian methods 
to assess how economic activity responds to oil price shocks arising from supply shocks and 
demand shocks originating in the United States or elsewhere in the world.  We find that both oil 
supply and oil demand shocks have contributed significantly to oil price fluctuations and that 
U.S. output fluctuations are derived largely from domestic shocks. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
Since early 2003, the price of crude oil has nearly quadrupled, increasing from around 
$30 per barrel (for West Texas Intermediate crude oil) to about $115 in late summer 2008.  In 
addition to little excess OPEC production capacity, an uncertainty premium brought about by 
geopolitical tensions, and a weak dollar; part of the strength in oil prices is attributed to the 
strength of Chinese, Indian, U.S. and European oil demand and to expectations that world oil 
demand will grow faster than supply over coming decades. 
Since World War II, oil prices have gone hand-in-hand with U.S. recessions.  In fact, nine 
of the ten post-WWII recessions have been preceded by episodes of sharply rising oil prices 
(Figure 1).  The 1960 recession is the one exception. 
Economic research has long documented a relationship between oil price shocks and 
slowing U.S. economic activity, with the consequences being slower GDP growth and possible 
recession, higher unemployment rates, and a higher price level.  Some of the earlier studies 
include Pierce and Enzler (1974), Rasche and Tatom (1977), Mork and Hall (1980), Gisser and 
Goodwin (1986) and the Energy Modeling Forum 7 study documented in Hickman et al. (1987).    2
Darby (1982), Burbidge and Harrison (1984), and Bruno and Sachs (1982, 1985) 
documented similar oil-price-economy relationships for countries other than the United States.  
Hamilton (1983) extended the analysis period to show that all but one of the U.S. post-WWII 
recessions were preceded by sharply rising oil prices.  The apparent lack of a favorable response 
of economic activity to falling oil prices led to later studies—such as Ferderer (1996), Hamilton 
(1996, 2003), Davis and Haltiwanger (2001) and Balke, Brown and Yücel (2002)—that allowed 
for an asymmetric relationship between oil price shocks and economic activity. 
Several studies contend that the apparent relationship between oil price shocks and 
aggregate economic activity comes through monetary policy.  Bohi (1989, 1991) and Bernanke, 
Gertler and Watson (1997) argue that a contractionary monetary policy response to oil price 
shocks accounted for much of the decline in aggregate economic activity following an oil price 
increase.  In a somewhat different vein, Barsky and Kilian (2001, 2004) contend that swings 
between expansionary and contractionary monetary policy created cycles in which rising oil 
prices preceded but did not cause the economic downturns of the 1970s and 80s. 
A number of other studies accord a much smaller role to monetary policy.  Ferderer 
(1996) provides evidence that counter-inflationary monetary policy was only partially 
responsible for the real effects of oil price shocks over the period from 1970 to 1990.  Davis and 
Haltiwanger (2001) showed that the effect of oil price shocks on employment growth were twice 
that of monetary policy shocks.  Brown and Yücel (1999) argue that monetary policy wasn’t 
necessarily contractionary.  Hamilton and Herrera (2004) show that the reduction in interest rates 
necessary to offset the aggregate effects of rising oil prices are outside historical experience, and 
Herrera and Pesavento (forthcoming) find that monetary policy a had much smaller effect than 
that estimated by Bernanke, Gertler and Watson.    3
Although the relationship between oil prices and economic activity seemed fairly robust 
and reasonably well understood by the mid-1990s, the relationship seemed to have weakened in 
the late 1990s and the 2000s—as shown by the relationship between oil prices and the cyclical 
component of GDP (Figure 2).  The increase in oil prices in the early 1970s, the tripling of oil 
prices in 1979 and the sharp oil-price gains during the first Iraq war preceded declines in the 
cyclical component of real GDP.  Since the mid-1990s, however, episodes of sharp oil price 
increases have not led declines in the cyclical component of real GDP—with the most noticeable 
period being since 2003 when oil prices more than quadrupled. 
  The apparent weakening or reversal of the past economic effects of oil price shocks has 
stimulated a new literature about why the U.S. economy might respond differently to rising oil 
prices in the 2000s than it did in the 1970s and early 80s.
1  Contributions include Huntington 
(2003), CBO (2006), Blanchard and Gali (2007), Bodenstein, Erceg and Guerrieri (2007), and 
Segal (2007).  The explanations include more stable aggregate demand (possibly the result of 
better luck or increased global financial integration), the reduced energy intensity of the U.S. 
economy, greater flexibility of the U.S. economy (including labor and financial markets), 
increased experience with energy price shocks, and better monetary policy.  
Most of the explanations that have been offered for a changed response to oil price 
shocks treat oil price shocks as exogenous and point to quantitatively smaller effects rather than 
qualitatively different effects.  But exogenous oil supply shocks need not be the only forces that 
push oil prices higher.  Kilian (2007) identifies oil price shocks as arising from crude oil supply 
shocks, shocks to global oil demand and precautionary demand associated with uncertainty about 
                                                           
1 A more general literature examines the increased stability of the U.S. economy since the mid-1980s, with 
explanations that include structural changes in the U.S. economy, better luck and improved monetary policy.  See 
Kim and Nelson (1999a), McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Blanchard and Simon (2001), Kahn, McConnell and 
Perez-Quiros (2002), Stock and Watson (2003), Bernanke (2004) and Boivin and Giannoni (2006).    4
oil supply shortfalls.  In a similar vein, Elekdag and Laxton (2007) argue that the current oil 
price increases are demand driven, while earlier increases in oil prices were supply driven.  
Productivity gains can boost global economic growth and push oil prices upward at the same 
time. 
To analyze the effects of different types of economic shocks on aggregate economic 
activity and oil prices (while treating oil prices as endogenous), we develop a dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium model of world economic activity.  The model generally follows that of 
Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992) and Backus and Crucini (2000) and represents the world 
economy as two manufacturing countries and an oil-producing country.  We depart from Backus 
and Crucini in two important ways.  First, we represent all oil production and the evolution of oil 
reserves as endogenous.  In our model, oil producers face dynamic tradeoffs when deciding how 
much oil to produce: higher production today reduces the oil reserves available in the future.  Oil 
producers can invest to expand oil reserves, which increases future oil production capacity.  
Second, rather than calibrate the parameters of the model and use it for a simulation exercise, we 
use Bayesian methods to estimate the parameters of technology and preferences as well as the 
parameters for the stochastic process generating the exogenous shocks.  In the process of 
estimating the parameters, we also estimate realizations for the unobserved shock processes.   
The model allows us to examine empirically the effects of various types of shocks on oil 
markets and aggregate economic activity.  These shocks include: oil supply shocks, oil reserve 
shocks, total factor productivity shocks, labor supply shocks, shocks to the economic efficiency 
of oil use, and shocks in investment demand originating in the manufacturing countries.  The 
estimated model implies that shocks to oil production and reserves affect oil prices and output in    5
a way that is reminiscent of oil supply shocks.  Shocks in manufacturing countries look like a 
mixture of oil supply and demand shocks in the short run and oil demand shocks in the long run. 
Historical decompositions suggest that much of the recent gains in oil prices can be 
attributed to oil “demand” shocks, but the episodes of dramatic oil price increases in the 1970s 
and early 1980s were attributable mainly to oil supply shocks.  For the United States, the 
historical decompositions suggest these oil supply shocks had only moderate effects on economic 
growth.  The poor economic performance in the 1970s and early 1980s appears to have resulted 
mainly from the confluence of negative shocks to total factor productivity and labor supply. 
For recent years, the historical decompositions suggest that oil prices and U.S. real GDP 
have moved in the same direction for two reasons.  Increases in total factor productivity have 
boosted U.S. GDP overwhelming the negative effects of oil supply shocks.  Furthermore, 
improvements in the economic efficiency of oil use have simultaneously boosted U.S. GDP and 
the demand for oil. 
2.  The Model 
Following Backus and Crucini (2000), we represent the world as three countries.  Two of 
the countries each produce a final manufactured good.  The third country produces oil, which is 
an intermediate good used in the production of the manufactured goods.  Departing from Backus 
and Crucini, we treat oil production and the evolution of oil reserves in the oil-producing country 
as completely endogenous.
2  Treating oil-production and pricing as endogenous in our 
framework allows us to more thoroughly examine the economic effects of total factor 
productivity shocks in the two manufacturing countries, as well as to consider the economic 
effects of oil supply shocks.  The former is critical to distinguishing between productivity shocks 
                                                           
2 Backus and Crucini represent oil production as having an exogenous component (OPEC) and an endogenous 
supply component via a labor-only technology.     6
that could potentially increase world oil demand and prices from world oil supply shocks that 
increase oil prices.  In addition to making the oil sector more dynamic than is represented in the 
Backus and Crucini model, we add three additional shocks that will help the model better capture 
actual fluctuations in economic activity: labor wedge shocks, oil wedge shocks, and investment 
shocks. 
2.1  Consumers 
  In each of the three countries, consumers directly use the two manufactured goods and 
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 for the oil-producing country. 
For the manufacturing countries, leisure is the amount of time available after supplying 
labor to manufacturing, Lj,t = 1 - Nj,t.  For the oil-producing country, leisure is the amount time 
available after supplying labor to oil production and to reserve additions, Lo,t = 1 - No,t - Nx,t. 
The CES consumption aggregate for each country is as follows: 
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where Ac,j,t is country j’s use of good A for consumption; Bc,j,t is the country j’s use of good B for 
consumption; Ψj  captures the weight households place on the consumption of goods A and B; 
and μ is the elasticity of substitution between goods A and B. 
  When estimating the model empirically, a preference shock is also added to the model 
that captures fluctuations in the wedge between the measured marginal rate of substitution 
between leisure and consumption and the marginal product of labor in the two manufacturing 
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 is the consumption deflator in country j.  Changes in the wedge act like a labor supply 
shock.  This shock could reflect not only changes in preferences but also changes in wage 
markups or changes in marginal tax rates.  Hall (1997) and Chari, et al (2007) have argued that 
fluctuations in the wedge between marginal rate of substitution and marginal product of labor 
play an important role in labor market fluctuations. 
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2.2  Manufacturing, Production and Investment 
  In each of the manufacturing countries, output is a function of capital, labor, oil use and 
the technology available in each time period: 
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where Yj,t is country j output at time t, Kj,t is capital, Nj,t is labor, Oj,t is oil use, and Zj,t is total 
factor productivity.  One can think of this function as representing production as follows: oil and 
capital are used to produce capital services which are combined with labor to produce goods.  
The elasticity of substitution between capital and oil in the production of capital services is given 
by  ν / 1  and will generally be different than that between capital services and labor (which is 
unitary, given the Cobb-Douglas representation of the latter relationship).    8
As is done for the labor market, when taking the model to the data we add a stochastic 
wedge between the measured marginal product of oil and the relative price of oil.  The oil 
wedge, t j o , , ω , is defined such that 
t j
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product of oil in the production of country j’s output.  The wedge could reflect policies that 
affect the true price to firms of using oil (for example, taxes or environmental regulations).  The 
wedge also could reflect a difference between our model-based measure of the marginal product 
of oil and its true productivity—with a greater measured value of marginal product relative to 
true marginal product yielding a higher value of 
t j o MP , ,
t j o , , ω , assuming the real oil price is unchanged.  
The wedge acts as an additional source of fluctuations in oil demand in our empirical model. 
Similar to that for consumption, the CES investment aggregate for each manufacturing 
country is as follows: 
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where Ai,j,t is country j’s use of good A for investment,  Bi,j,t is the country j’s use of good B for 
investment.  Capital accumulation in each of the manufacturing countries takes into account 
depreciation and investment as follows: 
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where δ is the depreciation rate and Ij,t is investment.   ) K / I ( t , j t , j Φ  is the rate at which 
investment goods become capital and reflects adjustment costs in changing the stock of capital 
with   and  .    is a capital accumulation shock (similar to an additive 
productivity shock to investment).  One can think of this shock as reflecting shocks to investment 
demand that are unrelated to the future marginal product of capital. 
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2.3  Oil Production and Reserves 
  The production of oil is a function of oil reserves, labor, and the technology available in 
each time period: 
o o o ) N ) ( X ( Z Y t , o x t x t , o t , o
ρ ρ ρ − − − Ψ − + Ψ =
1
1
1 1 1                (6) 
where Yo,t is oil production at time t, Xt is oil reserves, No,t is the labor used in oil extraction, and 
Zo,t is the oil production technology.  Note that in time period t, Xt is predetermined. 
The evolution of oil reserves reflects both additions to reserves and the depletion due to 
production. Gross additions to reserves are made through use of investment goods and labor:  
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 where Ix,t is the capital investment for reserve additions, Nx,t is labor used for reserve additions, 
and Zx,t reflects total factor productivity in the production of reserves.  Net additions to reserves 
reflect not only loss of reserves due to production but also an adjustment cost mechanism similar 
to that employed by capital: 
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  One can view reserves in our model as representing total capital in the oil-
producing sector, which reflects oil-production infrastructure (capital) as well as oil in the 
ground.  The depletion of reserves (i.e., the depreciation of oil-producing capital) depends on 
how much oil is produced.    
. ) X / G ( g 1 = ′ Φ
Similar to that for the manufacturing countries, the CES investment aggregate for the oil 
reserve additions is as follows:    10
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where Ai,x,t is the use of the country a good in the process of making reserve additions, and Bi,x,t is 
the use of the country b good in the process of making reserve additions. 
2.4  International Market Clearing Constraints 
  In each period of time, the total quantities of each of the three goods must be completely 
used: 
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In addition, market-clearing prices and wages must be established. 
2.5  Exogenous Shocks  
  There are ten exogenous driving forces in our model.  Eight shocks originate in the two 
manufacturing countries.  For each manufacturing country, there are shocks to total factor 
productivity, the labor wedge, the oil wedge and investment.  The other two shocks originate in 
the oil-producing country.  They are a technology shock to oil production and a technology 
shock to the production of oil reserves.  With the exception of total factor productivity shocks, 
we assume that the (logs of the) exogenous driving forces follow independent first-order 
autoregressive processes.  Following Backus and Crucini (2000), we allow total factor 
productivity to be correlated across manufacturing countries, both contemporaneously and with a 
lagged spillover.  Unlike Backus and Crucini, the stochastic processes for these variables are not 
assumed to be the same across the two manufacturing countries.    11
2.6  Oil Supply Shocks 
As discussed above, the model’s implementation of oil demand is similar to that found in 
Backus and Crucini (2000).  On the supply side, the current model differs from Backus and 
Crucini by capturing both oil production and reserves. 
Maximizing the representative agent’s utility in the oil-producing country, taking prices 
as given, yields the following decisions rules for the production of oil and reserves.  Oil 
production is determined so that: 
t , o t , x t , o mc p p + = ,       (13) 
where   is the price of oil (in terms of the numeraire good),   is the price of reserves (user 
cost of oil), and   is the marginal cost of producing oil in time period t.  Given that the stock 
of reserves is fixed in time t,   where  is the wage (in terms of the numeraire 
good) in the oil-producing country and  is the marginal product of labor in the oil-producing 
country.  The first order condition for the production of reserves is given by:  
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 reflects the effect on adjustment costs next period 
of having more reserves available. 
  How do the two oil technology shocks affect oil output and prices?  For a given level of 
inputs, a negative technology shock to oil production,  , will lower the production of oil and 
increase marginal costs—lowering output and raising the price.  To the extent that the shock is 
persistent, it will result in higher prices for reserves both currently and in the future, stimulating 
the development of reserves in the future.  These reserve additions will stimulate future oil 
production. 
t , o Z
Although a negative technology shock to the development of reserves,  , has no direct 
effect on contemporaneous oil supply (recall that  is predetermined in time period t), it can 
affect current oil prices and output.  A negative shock to the development of reserves will mean 
fewer reserves in the future, which will reduce future oil production and raise future oil prices.  
Taken alone, this shock would boost the price of reserves and, hence, oil prices today.  On the 
other hand, a negative technology shock in the development of reserves can free up labor for oil 
production, which could result greater current production and lower oil prices.  The total effect 
on current oil production and prices depends on the comparative strengths of these two effects.   
t , x Z
t X
Modeling the oil-producing country as a price-taker is contrary to the view that OPEC 
sets production quotas or oil prices.  As long as price is a constant mark up over costs, however, 
such an assumption will not have an appreciable effect on our analysis.  Indeed, as we treat the 
price of reserves,  , as not directly observed, fluctuations in this variable will reflect any  t x p ,   13
fluctuations in the mark-up of oil prices over marginal costs.
3  Thus, changes in OPEC’s price 
setting stance will in part be captured by our measures of technology shocks to oil production 
and reserve development.  An exogenous cut in OPEC oil production, perhaps for geopolitical 
reasons, would look like a negative technology shock to oil production.
4 
3.  Model Solution and Estimation. 
To solve the model for a given set of parameters, we log-linearize the first order 
conditions of the social planner’s problem around the deterministic steady state and solve the 
resulting linear rational expectations model as in Blanchard and Kahn (1980).  Rather than 
calibrate the parameters, we use Bayesian methods to estimate the parameters of technology, 
preferences, and the stochastic processes generating the exogenous shocks.   
As in Backus and Crucini, we take the United States to be one of the manufacturing 
countries in the model.  The other manufacturing country denoted below by ROW, we take to be 
the OECD countries (less Mexico and the United States) plus Brazil, China, and India.  We take 
the time interval of the model to be quarterly and include eight quarterly time series in the 
estimation of the model.  These inclue: real oil prices (deflated by the U.S. GDP deflator), world 
oil production, U.S. real GDP, U.S. real consumption, U.S. real investment, U.S. hours, U.S. oil 
consumption and the relative price of imports to the United States. 
 While the relative price of U.S. imports, U.S. oil consumption and world oil production 
provide the information about economic activity in the ROW, it would be useful to include more 
direct information on economic activity in ROW.  Unfortunately, there are not quarterly data of 
sufficient length for many countries to construct a quarterly series for the ROW.  Because our 
                                                           
3 Petroleum Intelligence Weekly and the Oil and Gas Journal provide some data on the sales of reserves, but these 
prices may not be representative of overall market conditions because most reserves—particularly those of OPEC—
are not traded, and the value of reserves may vary considerably with the characteristics of the reserves. 
4 This abstracts from the cross-country wealth effect of an increase in the markup of oil prices.    14
estimation procedure readily handles the use of mixed frequency data (see appendix), however, 
we add annual ROW output and investment (in constant dollars) as two additional observation 
equations.  Thus, taken together we have eight quarterly observation equations and two annual 
observation equations.
5  Our sample period runs from 1970 through 2006.  
The linearized DSGE model links the observed time series and the underlying driving 
processes that result in deviations from the steady state.
6  Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods 
similar to those of Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) and Smets and Wouters (2007) are employed to 
estimate the posterior distribution of the parameters.
7  In the process of estimating the posterior 
distribution of the parameters, we also estimate a posterior distribution for the unobserved shock 
processes.  These estimates allow us to decompose movements in actual observables into 
contributions due to various exogenous shocks. 
3.1  Prior and posterior distributions of the structural parameters. 
In implementing the Bayesian estimation strategy, we must specify prior distributions for 
the structural parameters (parameters of technology and preferences) and the parameters of the 
stochastic processes of the ten exogenous driving forces.  For most of the structural parameters 
for the two manufacturing countries, we set the mode of the prior distribution to be equal to the 
values set in Backus and Crucini.  For the oil-producing country, we use information on the ratio 
of oil production to reserves,
X
Y0 , labor share in the production of oil, and the ratio of oil price to 
                                                           
5 For the United States and world oil, we find substantially similar results to those reported below when the model is 
not required to fit annual output and investment data for rest of the world.  The principal difference is that use of the 
rest of world data allows a better identification of the individual sources of rest-of-world shocks. 
6 The logs of U.S. real GDP, consumption, investment, hours, oil consumption; relative price of imports to the 
United States; rest of world output and investment; and world oil production are linearly detrended.  The logs of real 
oil price are demeaned. 
7 We use the random walk Metropolis-Hastings sampler to generate draws from the posterior distribution.  The 
transition equation in the Markov Chain depends on the Hessian of the posterior distribution evaluated at the 
posterior mode and shocks drawn from a t-distribution with five degrees of freedom.  We use 105,000 draws in our 
sampler with 100,000 draws as the burn in period.      15
reserve price , 







= , to help set the prior distributions of the parameters.  As for how 
much weight to place on the prior distribution versus the data when estimating the posterior 
distributions, we divide the parameters into roughly three groups.  Parameters like the discount 
factor or those that reflect shares of steady state values (for example, output elasticity of labor 
equals labor’s share in GDP) have relatively tight priors.  Parameters that reflect elasticities of 
substitution or adjustment costs for capital and reserves have more diffuse priors.  Finally, a third 
group of parameters, namely the parameters of the stochastic processes governing the driving 
forces have relatively uninformed priors—as we have very little direct prior information 
concerning these stochastic processes.  
Table 1 displays the prior and estimated posterior distributions of the structural 
parameters.   For many parameters, using the information in the data results in a substantial shift 
in the posterior distribution relative to the prior distribution; for most parameters the posterior 
distribution is substantially tighter than the prior distribution.  Not surprisingly given the tight 
priors for these parameters, the posterior distributions for the discount factor, labor’s share in 
manufacturing country GDP, the share of home and foreign goods, and the depreciation rate on 
capital are close to the values assumed in Backus and Crucini.   
Our posterior distribution suggests an estimate of the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution which is similar to that typically assumed in the macroeconomics literature.  The 
posterior distribution also suggests an elasticity of substitution between domestic and the foreign 
good that is substantially lower than that assumed in Backus and Crucini.
 8  On the other hand, 
the elasticity of substitution between oil and capital is slightly larger than in Backus and Crucini.  
                                                           
8 Given that Backus and Crucini calibrate their parameters to data for the United States and other OECD countries, it 
is not surprising that our estimated parameters take different values.   In addition, the dramatic swings in the relative    16
The posterior distributions for all three of these elasticities are substantially “tighter” than their 
prior distributions.  The posterior distribution for the elasticities of substitution in the oil 
production and reserve production technologies are still relatively “diffuse” suggesting the data 
are not too informative about these parameters.  Finally, the adjustment costs for capital are 
estimated to be substantially higher than those for oil reserves suggesting that it is easier to add 
to reserves than it is to add to capital in the manufacturing country.     
Table 2 presents the prior and posterior distributions for the stochastic processes 
governing the exogenous variables in the model.  Given that prior distributions were relatively 
uninformative, the data have a lot to say about these variables.  With the exception of ROW 
investment demand shocks, the autoregressive parameters are quite high suggesting that shocks 
are very persistent.  The standard deviation of shocks to oil production and oil reserves are 
relatively large compared to shocks in total factor productivity and investment shocks in the 
manufacturing countries.  The standard deviation of oil wedge shocks in the two manufacturing 
countries is very large suggesting that these two variables may be an important source of shocks 
to world oil demand.  On the other hand, the estimated spillover in total productivity is relatively 
small.  Finally, the variances of ROW shocks, with the exception of the investment shock, are 
estimated to be larger than U.S. shocks. 
3.2 Model Evaluation 
To evaluate the relative fit of the model, we compare our benchmark model to a model in 
which the structural parameters are set to the values assumed by Backus and Crucini (the 
parameters of the shock processes are estimated as in the benchmark model) and to a state space 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
import price over our sample period likely contribute to a relatively low value for the elasticity of substitution 
between home and foreign goods.       17
model in which the state equation is a VAR(1) with relatively uninformed priors.
9  We use a 
state space-VAR(1) rather than a traditional VAR(1) model for comparison because we have 
only annual data for rest-of-world output and investment. 
                                                          
To assess our model’s overall “goodness of fit”, we construct marginal likelihoods and 
Bayes factors for the three models.
10  These are presented in Table 3.  Our benchmark model 
appears to “fit” the data better than the two alternative models.  As mentioned above, with the 
exception of the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods, the modes of the 
posterior distribution for most of the structural parameters in the benchmark model are similar to 
the values assumed in Backus and Crucini.  However, because of the large swings in the relative 
import price over our sample, a low value for the elasticity of substitution between domestic and 
foreign goods in the benchmark model substantially improves the fit of the model.  The 
benchmark model fits better than the state space-VAR(1) model in part because relatively diffuse 
priors are assumed for the latter model’s vastly greater number of parameters.  Unfortunately, we 
were unable to conceive of “naturally suggestive” non-diffuse prior distributions for the reduced 
form state space model that yielded an improvement over the model with diffuse priors.
11 
4.  Impulse Responses 
To obtain a better picture of what the model implies about oil shocks and economic 
activity, we examine how oil markets and real U.S. GDP respond to a variety of shocks, 
including a negative oil production shock, a negative oil reserve shock, a positive total factor 
productivity shock, a positive labor wedge shock, a positive oil wedge shock, and a negative U.S. 
 
9 The benchmark and Backus and Crucini models are evaluated assuming the same prior distributions.  Recall that 
Backus-Crucini parameters are the modes of the prior distributions for the benchmark model. 
10 We use the harmonic mean estimator proposed by Geweke (1999) with a truncation probability of 0.8. 
11 State space models with a higher order VAR describing the state equations quickly become quite large as one adds 
lags.  The state space-VAR(1) model contains 155 parameters while a VAR(2) model contains 255 parameters.  We 
experimented with imposing Minnesota type priors, but these priors did not improve the performance of the state 
space-VAR(1) model in this particular application.     18
investment demand shock.  Different types of shocks can yield similar responses in oil prices and 
production.  In many cases, the longer-term dynamics of a shock differ from its short-run effects.   
As modeled here, a shock is an unexpected and temporary deviation in a series away 
from its long-term trend.  Such shocks show persistence, but eventually dissipate.  For each 
series, we report impulse responses for the mean, 5
th and 95
th percentile of the posterior 
distribution. 
4.1 Effects on the Oil Market 
We find that an oil production shock yields oil-market dynamics that are like the classic 
supply shock envisioned in most economic research.  As shown in Figure 3A, an oil production 
shock boosts the price of oil.  As the shock dissipates, the price of oil returns toward its long-
term steady state.   
An oil reserve shock yields initially leads to slightly higher production and lower prices, 
as the negative technology shock to reserve production frees up labor for oil production. Over the 
longer-term, however, lower reserves yield reduced oil production and higher oil prices. 
    From the perspective of oil-market dynamics, a total factor productivity shock in the 
United States initially looks similar to an oil-supply shock.  The price of oil is pushed upward 
and oil production is initially reduced as investment is redirected to the manufacturing countries.  
Over the longer-term, increased oil demand is translated into increased oil production, but oil 
production lags behind the growth of manufacturing, which sustains higher oil prices. 
An increase in the labor wedge acts like a negative shock to labor supply that reduces 
U.S. employment and output.  As shown in Figure 3B, such a shock initially looks like a supply 
shock for oil—weaker economic activity reduces oil consumption, but the relative price of oil is    19
pushed upward as U.S. firms substitute oil for labor.  Over the longer-term, a decline in 
manufacturing output dominates, and the oil price and output fall. 
An increased oil wedge could be the result of higher energy taxation or reduced economic 
efficiency in the use of oil.  An increased U.S. oil wedge has relatively simple dynamics.  The 
initial and longer-term effects are a negative shock to oil demand that depresses the price of oil 
and reduces oil output. 
A positive investment shock in the United States generates complicated dynamics in the 
world oil market.  The initial responses look like an oil supply shock.  The relative price of oil is 
pushed upward and oil production falls.  This is due primarily to a decline in the demand for U.S. 
output, and as a result the relative price of oil rises.  Over the longer-term, the relative price of oil 
remains high but oil production is increased. 
As can be seen, interpreting the dynamics of the oil market through oil prices and 
production is fraught with difficulty.  Different types of economic shocks can yield similar 
outcomes in the oil market, and the long-term dynamics of a particular shock can be different 
from the short-term effects.  These results suggest that additional information about the source of 
oil price shocks might be gleaned by examining how the shocks affect overall economic activity. 
4.2  Effects on U.S. Economic Activity 
As shown in Figure 4, a negative oil-production shock reduces U.S. output.  The negative 
effects on economic activity gradually moderate over time.  Similarly, a negative shock to oil 
reserves reduces U.S. output. 
As expected, a favorable shock to total factor productivity in the United States boosts 
U.S. output.  The gains in output are driven directly by increased productivity—and also by the 
increased investment, work and oil use that are stimulated by enhanced productivity.  Although    20
the estimated parameter for total productivity spillovers is relatively small, a foreign productivity 
gain yields small gains in U.S. output—with those gains the result of productivity spillovers and 
increased exports, investment and labor. 
An increase in the U.S. labor wedge (or decrease in labor supply) reduces U.S. output.  
An increase in the labor wedge abroad also generates U.S. output losses—with those losses the 
result of reduced trade.  
 Both a decrease in the economic efficiency of U.S. use of oil (an increased oil wedge) 
and a negative investment demand shock in the United States reduce U.S. output.  Foreign 
shocks in these variables stimulate U.S. output by making oil and investment capital more 
available to the United States. 
4.3  Oil Price Shocks and U.S. Economic Activity 
The impulse response functions show avenues through which oil price movements and 
U.S. GDP may be negatively related, positively related or seemingly unrelated.  As expected, oil 
supply shocks generate a negative relationship between oil prices and U.S. economic activity.  
The model reflects oil supply shocks originating from both production and reserves.  Taken 
together, these two supply shocks imply that the estimated mean oil price elasticity of U.S. real 
GDP is −0.018.  The interior 90 percent of the posterior distribution for the elasticity is −0.012 to 
−0.029.   These estimates are at the lower end of the range, −0.012 to −0.12, found by previous 
empirical research for the United States.
 12 
Shocks to the ROW oil wedge and U.S. capital accumulation also generate an inverse 
relationship between oil price fluctuations and U.S. output.  In essence, a positive capital 
accumulation shock implies less investment is needed to reach the desired level of capital stock.  
                                                           
12 See Jones, Leiby and Paik (2004).  If the model is not asked to fit annual data for the rest of the world, somewhat 
higher estimates of the oil price elasticity of real GDP are obtained.    21
Thus, the capital accumulation shock works like a negative investment demand shock and leads 
to lower U.S. output.  In contrast, shocks to U.S. and ROW total factor productivity, the U.S. oil 
wedge, and ROW investment generate a positive relationship between oil price and U.S. GDP.  
Shocks to the labor wedges affect economic activity but have relatively little effect on oil prices. 
5.  Historical Decompositions 
  Historical decompositions show the contribution of each shock to the evolution of oil 
prices and U.S. GDP.  In each of the figures, we represent the actual history of the variable over 
the past 37 years and the mean, 5
th percentile and 95
th percentile of the posterior distribution.  
The extent to which the posterior distribution moves with the historical series shows the extent to 
which the variable explains the historical movement. 
5.1  Real Oil Price 
  Figures 5A-C display historical decomposition for real oil prices.  Figure 5A summarizes 
the relative contributions of oil supply shocks, oil demand shocks and demand shocks from the 
U.S. and ROW to world oil price movements.  The historical decomposition suggests that the 
rapid rise in the oil price from 1973 through the early 1980s was largely driven by oil supply 
shocks, with ROW demand shocks contributing to the oil price increases in the early 1980s.  The 
decline in oil prices in the mid-1980s and again during 1998 and 1999 appears to be equally 
driven by oil supply and oil demand shocks.  Much of the recent run-up in oil prices is demand 
driven—with roughly equal contributions from the United States and the ROW.   
  Among the two types of oil supply shocks, shocks to oil production are much more 
important to the evolution of world oil prices than are oil reserve shocks (Figure 5B).  On the 
demand side, shocks to the economic efficiency of oil use in both the United States and the ROW 
are relatively important (Figure 5C).  Total factor productivity shocks make only a small    22
contribution to oil price movements.  For oil price movements, shocks to the U.S. and ROW 
labor wedges and investment demand are relatively unimportant. 
5.2  U.S. Output 
  Figures 6A-C display historical decomposition for U.S. real GDP.  Figure 6A 
summarizes the relative contributions of oil, domestic, and foreign shocks on U.S. real GDP.  As 
shown in the figure, the model implies that domestic shocks are largely responsible for U.S. 
output fluctuations.  Oil shocks contribute only moderately to U.S. output fluctuations, and ROW 
shocks are much less important.   
  As shown in Figures 6B-C, shocks to U.S. total factor productivity and to the labor 
wedge appear to be the most important sources of domestic shocks for real U.S. GDP.  Strongly 
related to traditional business cycle fluctuations, the labor wedge contributes substantially to 
output declines in every recession in our sample.  This is consistent with previous findings such 
as Hall (1997) and Chari, et al. (2007).  Shocks to the U.S. oil wedge and investment demand, 
while not as important as productivity and labor supply shocks, do contribute to output 
fluctuations over our sample.   
5.3  Oil Prices and Sources of U.S. Economic Fluctuations 
Taken together, figures 5 and 6 provide an interesting perspective on recent economic 
history.  The historical decompositions show that oil production shocks are the most important 
source of oil price fluctuations and a moderate source of U.S. economic fluctuation.  
Unfavorable oil production shocks boost oil prices and moderately reduce U.S. GDP.  The 
historical decompositions also show that shocks originating in the United States are a moderately 
important source of oil price fluctuations and the most important source of U.S. output 
fluctuations.    23
Changes in total factor productivity, the labor wedge, the oil wedge, and investment 
demand have all contributed to fluctuations in U.S. real GDP.  Of these shocks, those arising 
from the oil wedge contribute the most to movements in world oil prices.  Consistent with the 
impulse response functions, shocks originating in the United States generally contribute to a 
positive relationship between oil prices and U.S. output—although the impulse response 
functions for shocks to the labor wedge and investment demand show much greater effect on 
U.S. economic activity than on oil prices. 
The historical decompositions also show that shocks originating abroad that are unrelated 
to oil supply are a fairly important source of world oil price fluctuation without having much net 
effect on U.S. output.  The oil price gains driven by foreign demand shocks do not have the 
generally negative effect on U.S. economic activity that results from oil supply shocks.  
Although the gains from trade and productivity spillovers to the United States are small, they 
seem to offset any economic losses that arise from the effects of higher oil prices.
13 
5.4  Comparing the 1970s and the 2000s 
  The relatively poor U.S. economic performance in the mid-1970s though the early 1980s 
appears to have been bad luck—that is, a confluence of negative factors.  Oil supply shocks 
contributed moderately to the poor economic performance, as did shocks to total factor 
productivity and the labor wedge.  In the late 1970s, the increased economic efficiency of U.S. 
oil use—as reflected in reduced oil wedge—provided a slight stimulus to U.S. economic activity 
while boosting oil prices.  This favorable effect on U.S. economic activity was dominated by the 
negative factors at work during the time. 
                                                           
13  When the model’s structural parameters are set to values assumed by Backus and Crucini, oil supply shocks and 
ROW shocks contribute more to U.S. GDP movements.  Recall that the mode of the posterior distribution for the 
elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods is 0.34 in our model, while Backus and Crucini set it at    24
Our findings for the 1970s are generally consistent with Blanchard and Gali (2007), as 
well as Nordhaus (2004), Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997), and Samaniego (2006).  Blanchard 
and Gali find the poor U.S. economic performance of the 1970s owes a combination of adverse 
oil price shocks and other bad luck.  Nordhaus shows that the 1970s productivity slowdown was 
concentrated in the most energy-intensive sectors, and Greenwood and Yorukoglu and 
Samaniego variously attribute some of the negative productivity shocks of that era to significant 
learning costs associated with the adoption of new technologies and the necessity of plant-level 
reorganization.
14 
For more recent years, Blanchard and Gali find rising oil prices had small negative 
effects on output that were generally dwarfed by the effects of other positive shocks.  Although 
we do find some evidence that unfavorable oil supply shocks weakened U.S. economic activity 
in recent years, our findings are somewhat different.  We find the strong growth in U.S. real 
GDP during the 1990s and 2000s reflects several different sources.  The first contribution was an 
investment boom in the early and mid-1990s.  The second contribution came from increased total 
factor productivity, which began to make an impact in the mid-1990s and mostly continues 
through the end of the sample in 2006.  Gains in the economic efficiency of U.S. oil use also 
provided a slight stimulus to U.S. economic activity while boosting oil prices.  Because these 
gains in total factor productivity and the economic efficiency of oil use also helped drive oil 
prices higher, we find evidence of relatively benign mechanisms in which oil prices and 
economic activity were both driven upward by the same forces.  At the same time, foreign 
productivity shocks boosted oil prices without much net effect on U.S. economic activity. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1.5.  A higher elasticity of substitution implies that for a given change in relative prices, the quantity response is 
greater. 
14 Some of the negative productivity shocks of the 1970s may also be the result of the new and relatively inefficient 
environmental regulation introduced during that era.    25
 
5.5  Sources of ROW Fluctuations 
Although our focus has been primarily on oil price movements and U.S. economic 
activity, our model does have something to say about fluctuations in the rest of the world.  Figure 
7 plots the mean (and 5
th and 95
th percentiles) of the posterior distribution for the total 
contribution of all the shocks to ROW GDP.  Figure 7 also shows the source of the ROW 
fluctuations as originating from the oil sector, U.S. shocks, and ROW shocks.  Even though the 
model is quarterly and the ROW data are annual, the model tracks movements in ROW GDP 
relatively well.  As the figure shows, oil shocks explain relatively little of the fluctuations in 
ROW GDP; the largest contribution occurred in the early 1980s.   Shocks originating in the 
United States contribute even less to fluctuations in ROW GDP.  Fluctuations in ROW output 
fluctuations are driven primarily by ROW shocks, with TFP shocks and labor wedge shocks 
being the most important (details available upon request).  The dramatic gain in ROW GDP at 
the end of the sample can be mostly attributed to increases in ROW TFP.   
6.  Conclusions 
  Oil prices have nearly quadrupled since early 2003, but U.S. economic activity expanded 
rapidly for a number of those years—even as oil prices increased.  As we have seen, the factors 
driving oil price gains also determine the effect on overall economic activity.  Oil supply shocks 
alone do not explain the changes in economic activity or oil markets over the past decade.  Our 
historical decompositions show that shocks to oil production, oil reserves, the economic 
efficiency of U.S. and foreign energy use, U.S. and foreign investment and U.S. total factor 
productivity have contributed to oil price movements and fluctuations in real economic activity    26
over the past 37 years.  The labor wedge is an important source of U.S. economic fluctuation 
without much effect on oil prices. 
  Of these factors, increased U.S. total factor productivity and the improved economic 
efficiency in the U.S. use of oil seem to have contributed to a positive relationship between oil 
prices and U.S. real GDP in recent years.  During the same period, economic shocks originating 
abroad also seem to have generally contributed to an increase in world oil prices without 
negative consequences for U.S. output.  Better luck—in the form of a confluence of oil supply 
shocks and favorable shocks to U.S. economic activity—has added to the appearance of a more 
favorable relationship between oil prices and economic activity. 
  In contrast with the recent experience, the 1970s and early 1980s saw rising oil prices and 
a poor U.S. economic performance.  Negative oil supply shocks and increased foreign oil 
demand toward the end of the period pushed oil prices upward.  The oil-supply shocks 
contributed to the relatively poor U.S. economic performance, but the United States also 
experienced weakening total factor productivity, which may have been the result of adjustment 
to new capital that embodied information technology.  By not taking into account these declines 
in total factor productivity, the earlier literature on the negative effects of oil-price shocks may 
have overestimated the magnitude that such shocks have on economic activity.  
As we have seen, oil price increases arising from productivity gains and other shocks can 
have a substantially different effect on oil markets and economic activity than those arising from 
oil supply shocks.  Unfavorable oil supply shocks boost oil prices and reduce aggregate 
economic activity.  Favorable domestic productivity shocks boost GDP while pushing oil prices 
upward.  Favorable foreign productivity shocks may be mildly beneficial, as the increased trade 
and technology spillovers more than offset the negative effects of higher oil prices.    27
These substantially different effects have important implications for our understanding of 
the relationship between oil prices and aggregate economic activity.  In a world where strong 
economic growth and rising oil demand in China and India have combined with more moderate 
gains in Europe and the United States to put tremendous upward pressure on oil prices, different 
types of economic shocks have different consequences for oil prices and economic activity.  
Some shocks can result in a positive relationship between oil prices and aggregate economic 
activity.  The negative correlation that seemed to characterize the relationship between oil prices 
and economic activity in the 1970s and early 80s does not well describe a global economy where 
oil price gains are being driven by forces other than unfavorable oil supply shocks. 
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Technical Appendix 
A.  Details of the Model 
Manufacturing countries a and b 
  We write the log linearized (around the deterministic steady state) first order conditions 
for the social planners’ problem.  From the FOCs with respect to b a j A t j c , , , , = : 
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where   is the labor/leisure ratio for country j,   is the (shadow) price of good A, 
and   is a preference shock that will be the source of the wedge between the measured 
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure and the marginal product of labor.  
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where    is the steady state expenditure share in country j on good a.  
Linearized FOCs for labor for country a and b are: 
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The linearized FOCs for oil inputs for country a and b are: 
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where   is the wedge between the marginal product of oil and the relative price of oil in 
country j.  Output of country j is given by 
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The log linearized capital accumulation equation is given by: 
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where   is capital accumulation shock (or alternatively investment demand shock).  t j k z , , ˆ
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The oil-producing country, o 
The linearized FOCs for consumption: 
From the FOC with respect to :  t o c A , ,
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where  LL ξ is the elasticity of the marginal utility of leisure with respect to leisure,   is the 
elasticity of the marginal product of labor in the production of oil with respect to labor,   is the 
elasticity of the marginal product of labor in the production of oil with respect to reserves, and 
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where   is the elasticity of the marginal product of labor in the production of reserves with 
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with respect to reserve investment, and   is the (shadow) price of reserves.   Oil output is 
given by 
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where   in the steady state.  The linearized FOC for reserves is:  o Y G =   32
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B.  Observation Equations in the State Space Model 
Our data consists of observations on US GDP, consumption, investment, and 
employment, the relative (non oil) import price for the US, US oil consumption (barrels), real oil 
price (deflated by US GDP deflator), world oil production (barrels), ROW real GDP (PPP, in 
dollars),  and ROW real investment (PPP, in dollars).  For several variables the mapping between 
the model and the data are exact:  t , a
cons
t , us C ˆ Y ˆ = ,  t , a
inv
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t , o t , output oil Y ˆ Y ˆ = , and  t , a
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t , us O ˆ Y ˆ = .  However, several variables need to be transformed to 
correspond to the data we will employ.  Output in the model corresponds to gross output rather 
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C.  Bayesian Estimation of the DSGE Model 
  One can write the solution to the linearized, rational expectations DSGE model in terms 
of a state space model: 




t S Y Π =
  .          ( C 2 )  
el mod
t t t V MS S + = −1
el mod
t Y  is a vector of endogenous variables in the model.   is the state vector which includes 
the capital stocks of US (country a) and ROW (country b) and oil reserves as well as the ten 
exogenous shock variables: TFP, labor wedge, oil wedge, investment (capital accumulation) 
shocks for countries a and b and oil production and oil reserve shocks.   
el mod
t S
The model is written in terms of quarters while we have only annual data for ROW GDP 
and ROW investment.  Thus, we partition the observation equation of the state space model into    34
two sets of equations—one corresponding to quarterly observations, the other corresponding to 
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.      ( C 4 )  
  The empirical state space model implied by (C3) and (C4) can be rewritten as: 
        ( C 5 )   ) R , ( MVN ~ W , W S ) ( H Y t t t
obs
t 0 + = θ
  )) ( Q , ( MVN ~ V , V S ) ( F S t t t t θ θ 0 1 + = − .       ( C 6 )  
obs
t Y  is the vector of observable time series,  is the vector of unobserved state variables, and  t S θ  
is the vector of structural parameters in the DSGE model.  In our application,   contains 
detrended quarterly per capita real U.S. GDP, detrended quarterly per capita real U.S. 
consumption, detrended quarterly per capita real U.S. investment, detrended per captia quarterly 
U.S. oil consumption, detrended quarterly world oil production, demeaned quarterly real oil 
price, detrended quarterly real non-oil import price for the U.S, detrended annual real GDP for 
ROW (PPP constant US dollars), and detrended annual real investment expenditures for ROW 
(PPP constant US dollars).  We scale up all the variables by 100.  We set 
obs
t Y
R  to be a diagonal 
matrix with diagonal elements equal to .  We treat observations for the annual data as 
missing for all but the fourth quarter of the year.   
4 10
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    Given the parameters,θ , we can estimate the unobserved states by the Kalman Filter.  
The predictive log likelihood of the state space model is given by: 
   (C7) 
)} S ) ( H Y ( ) R ) ( H P )' ( H ( )' S ) ( H Y ( .
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+ − =∑
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θ θ θ Y
where   and  is the conditional mean and variance of  from the Kalman filter.    1 − t | t S 1 − t | t P t S
  Given a prior distribution over parameters,  ) ( h θ , the posterior distribution,  ) | ( P T Y θ , 
is  
) ( h )) , ( l exp( ) | ( P θ θ θ T T Y Y ∝ .          ( C 8 )  
Because the log-likelihood is a highly nonlinear function of the structural parameter vector, it is 
not possible to write an analytical expression for the posterior distribution.  As a result, we use 
Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods to estimate the posterior distribution of the 
parameter vector, θ .  In particular, we employ a Metropolis-Hasting sampler to generate draws 
from the posterior distributions.  The algorithm is as follows: 
(i)  Given a previous draw of the parameter vector, 
) i ( 1 − θ , draw a candidate vector   
from the distribution  ) | .   
c θ
( g
) i ( 1 − θ θ
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(iii)  Determine a new draw from the posterior distribution, 
) i ( θ . 
c ) i ( θ θ =  with probability  ) ,  
) i ( ) 1 − =θ  with probability  ) , . 
(
) i ( c 1 − θ θ α
i ( θ (
) i ( c 1 1
− − θ θ α
(iv)  Return to (i).    36
Starting from an initial parameter vector and repeating enough times, the distribution parameters 
draws,  , will converge to the true posterior distribution.   
) i ( θ
In our application,   where   is drawn from a multivariate t-distribution 
with five degrees of freedom and a covariance matrix
v
) i ( c + =
−1 θ θ v
Σ .  We set Σ  to be a scaled value of the 
Hessian matrix of  )) ( h ln( )) , ( l θ − θ − T Y evaluated at the posterior mode.  We choose the scaling 
so that around 20%-30% of the candidate draws are accepted.  We run the sampler 105,000 
times, keeping the last 5,000 draws to estimate the posterior distribution.  We also obtain the 
posterior distributions for the unobserved states.  Given a parameter draw, we draw from the 
conditional posterior distribution for the unobserved states,  .  Here we use the 
“filter forward, sample backwards” approach proposed by Carter and Kohn (1994) and discussed 
in Kim and Nelson (1999b).  
) , | ( P
) i (
T T Y S Θ
 
D.  Data Sources for Rest of World (Oil-Consuming Country) 
In order to obtain an approximate estimate of the data for the rest of world oil-consuming 
country, we aggregate data from 29 countries—Brazil, China, and India, plus 26 of the 30 OECD 
countries.  We exclude the United States, whose data is used for the Home Country in the model; 
Mexico, which is a major oil-producing country, and the Czech Republic and Slovakia, neither 
of which have reliable data prior to 1990.   Because real GDP and investment are reported in 
U.S. dollars, we aggregate these series across countries.  We convert ROW GDP and investment 
to per capita series by dividing with population aggregated across countries.   
For the period 1970 to 2003, the data for population, real GDP, and real investment for 
all 29 countries are taken from the Penn World Table.  For the period 2004 through 2006, the 
data for the 26 OECD countries are from the OECD; and the data for Brazil, India and China are    37
from Haver Analytics.  The data from 2004 to 2006 were spliced to the earlier data in 2003, 
country by country, and then aggregated to obtain per capita measures of ROW output and 
investment. 
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Table 1.  Prior and posterior distributions of structural parameters 
 
 
  Prior distribution  Posterior distribution 











Discount factor ( )  β Beta  0.99 0.981 0.994 0.990 0.991 0.988 0.993 
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 
( σ / 1 ) 
Gamma 0.5  0.218 1.052 0.344 0.369 0.249 0.598 
Elast. of subst. home and foreign goods 
( μ / 1 )  Gamma 1.5  0.238 4.329 0.341 0.335 0.228 0.472 
Share of foreign goods in invest. and 
cons.  Beta  0.15 0.116 0.193 0.094 0.090 0.072 0.106 
Labor’s share in time 
  Beta  0.3  0.241 0.367 0.291 0.290 0.248 0.336 
Labor’s share GDP ( )  α
 
Beta  0.64 0.600 0.677 0.597 0.601 0.568 0.634 
Depreciation rate on capital ( )  δ Beta 0.025  0.019 0.033 0.017 0.016 0.012 0.019 
Capital adjustment cost 
   Gamma  0.05 0.026  0.99  0.187 0.215 0.139 0.296 
Elasticity of marginal utility of leisure in 
oil country (x-1)  Gamma  2  0.692  12.578  7.951 7.324 3.881  12.819 
Elast. of subst. oil and capital   Gamma  0.09  0.035  1.066  0.104  0.105  0.087  0.124 
Energy expenditure relative to GDP Beta  0.1  0.072 0.139 0.058 0.057 0.048 0.066 
Labor share in oil country GDP  Beta  0.5  0.272 0.795 0.488 0.447 0.287 0.642 
x o p / p   Gamma
*
  6  3.044  16.739  5.703 5.732 3.988 8.218 
X / Yo   Beta  0.0065  0.0044 0.0098 0.0052 0.0045 0.0031 0.0067 
Elasticity of subst. in oil production  Gamma  1  0.409 3.148 1.357 1.664 0.566 3.639 
Elasticity of subst. in reserve prod.  Gamma  1  0.409 3.148 0.830 0.813 0.180 1.796 
Reserve adjustment cost   Gamma  0.05 0.026  0.99  0.046 0.059 0.026 0.187 
                                                           
* The prior distribution for  - 1 is a gamma distribution.  x o p / p42
 
 
Table 2.  Prior and posterior distributions of parameters of exogenous driving forces 
 
 
  Prior distribution  Posterior distribution 











US total factor productivity  Beta  0.70 0.112 0.942 0.847 0.872 0.806 0.931 
ROW total factor productivity  Beta  0.70 0.112 0.942 0.981 0.983 0.972 0.990 
Spillover in total factor productivity Normal  0.088  0.006 0.170 0.029 0.022 0.006 0.039 
Oil  production  shock  Beta  0.70 0.112 0.942 0.890 0.903 0.867 0.932 
Oil reserve shock  Beta  0.70 0.112 0.942 0.980 0.978 0.956 0.994 
US labor wedge  Beta  0.70  0.112 0.942 0.998 0.998 0.993 0.999 
ROW labor wedge  Beta  0.70  0.112  0.942  0.994 0.996 0.989 0.999 
US oil wedge  Beta  0.70  0.112  0.942  0.891 0.906 0.879 0.933 
ROW oil wedge   Beta  0.70  0.112  0.942  0.732 0.750 0.654 0.831 
US investment shock  Beta  0.70  0.112  0.942  0.874 0.876 0.767 0.960 
ROW investment shock   Beta  0.70  0.112  0.942  0.989 0.994 0.982 0.999 
 
Standard  deviation  of  innovations            
US total factor productivity  Gamma  0.10  0.172  9.180  0.518 0.529 0.527 0.589 
ROW total factor productivity  Gamma  0.10 0.172 9.180 0.981 0.969 0.830 1.140 
Corr(US TFP, ROW TFP)  Beta
†
  0.258  -0.240 0.630 0.427 0.421 0.273 0.553 
Oil  production  shock  Gamma  0.10 0.172 9.180 2.937 3.019 2.394 3.595 
Oil reserve shock  Gamma  0.10 0.172 9.180 2.995 3.632 1.845 5.362 
US labor wedge  Gamma  0.10  0.172 9.180 0.882 0.881 0.785 0.976 
ROW labor wedge  Gamma  0.10  0.172 9.180 2.238 2.159 1.839 2.470 
US oil wedge  Gamma  0.10  0.172  9.180  16.665 16.743 14.486 19.311 
ROW  oil  wedge  Gamma 0.10  0.172  9.180  33.435 34.212 28.699 40.243 
US investment shock  Gamma  0.10 0.172 9.180 0.154 0.158 0.075 0.257 
ROW investment shock  Gamma  0.10 0.172 9.180 0.037 0.030 0.021 0.041 
  
                                                           
† The prior distribution for (Corr(US TFP,ROW TFP)+1)/2 is a beta distribution.  




Log marginal likelihood 
 












State space VAR(1) 
 
-2108.6 exp(580.5) 
* Ratio of marginal likelihood of benchmark model to alternative model.
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